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Abstract
In 1956, thousands of Hungarian refugees found a warm welcome in Switzerland. Swiss
students took to the streets to demonstrate against Soviet repression of the Hungarian
uprising. However, the upsurge of public sympathy for the refugees barely covered up
recent controversy in Switzerland over asylum policy during the years of fascism and the
Second World War. In 1954, only two years before the Hungarian refugee crisis, newly
released German foreign policy documents had revealed Swiss involvement in the
introduction of the ‘J’-stamp in 1938 to mark the passports of German (and formerly
Austrian) Jews, making it easier for Swiss immigration officials to identify Jews as
(undesirable) refugees. Those revelations came as a shock to the Swiss public, who
had taken pride in the country’s humanitarian achievements during the Second World
War and had readily accepted official propaganda aimed to counter Allied criticism of
Swiss neutrality policy. International and domestic indignation over those revelations
eventually motivated the Swiss government to mandate an official investigation into
asylum policy during the pre-war and wartime period. The findings of that examination
pointed to concerted efforts by the highest authorities to prevent Jewish refugees from
seeking asylum in Switzerland and turn them away at the Swiss border until 1944. This
led over the following decades to an ongoing debate on the history of asylum policy.
Closely linked to elements of national identity, such as neutrality, the Red Cross and
humanitarianism, the specifics of Swiss asylum policy were rarely considered in a wider
European context. In situating recent research on Swiss refugee policy during the ‘Forty
Years’ Crisis’ in a wider European context, this article reconsiders Switzerland’s
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situation as one of Nazi Germany democratic neighbours in the 1930s and as the only
neutral country within reach for many refugees during the Second World War. Placing
special emphasis on the transnational dynamics of refugee policies, it also questions
some of the received assumptions guiding the interpretation of the history of asylum in
Switzerland.
Keywords
Holocaust, Hungarian uprising, refugee policy, Switzerland
Whoever commands a small lifeboat that is already quite full, of limited capacity, and
with an equally limited amount of provisions, while thousands of victims of a sunken
ship scream to be saved, must appear hard when he cannot take everyone. And yet he
is still humane when he warns early against false hope and tries to save at least those
he had taken in.
So Eduard von Steiger, Head of the Federal Justice and Police Department,
explained on 30 August 1942 to an audience of young church activists.1 The
Minister’s analogy of an overcrowded lifeboat was meant to justify the govern-
ment’s controversial decision, secretly issued to the border guard on 13 August
1942, to close the border to civilian refugees. As the imagery suggested, the situ-
ation was, indeed, critical. In previous weeks, news about the arrest and deport-
ation of Jews in Belgium, France and Holland had reached the authorities and the
public from a variety of sources. And it could hardly escape decision-makers that
the deportation victims faced a terrible fate. On 12 August 1942, the socialist daily
La Sentinelle wrote ‘The systematic extermination of a race is being pursued’ in
Nazi-ruled Europe. Rejecting Jewish refugees under the prevailing circumstances,
an internal report concluded, ‘was hardly justiﬁable’ anymore.2
But that is exactly what the new order – to be revoked only in July 1944 –
demanded. Its most contentious paragraph read that ‘those who only took ﬂight
because of their race, Jews, for example, should not be considered political refu-
gees’ and, therefore, ought to be refused entry.3 Despite conﬁdentiality, these
details quickly leaked out. In border areas, the local population witnessed dramatic
scenes of refugees being expelled; crowds spontaneously gathered to prevent the
expulsion of civilians who had clandestinely entered the country and believed
1 Extracts from von Steiger’s speech cited after Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland –
Second World War: ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era (Bern 1999), 248 (note 85). The main
publications by the ICE are online available in English translation: http://www.uek.ch/en/index.htm
(accessed 1 April 2014).
2 Federal Archives (FA), Bern, E 27, 14446, Report by R. Jezler, 30 July 1942. For the quote from La
Sentinelle, see Ibid., 87, also G. Haas, ‘Wenn man gewusst ha¨tte, was sich dru¨ben im Reich abspielte.’
1941–1943: Was man in der Schweiz von der Judenvernichtung wusste (Basel 1994).
3 ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 90.
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themselves to have found safety.4 Media reports about the rejection of desperate
refugees aroused a storm of protest, which was followed by emotional debate in
parliament. Surprised by the intensity of public commotion over their asylum prac-
tice, the authorities temporarily relaxed restrictions only to tighten measures once
the noise had abated.
In the longer run, public dissent failed to induce oﬃcial change of heart, and the
August 1942 decision came to epitomize the shipwreck of proclaimed commitment
to humanitarian values. As a symbol for Switzerland’s burden of the past, the
lifeboat metaphor has since had a remarkable career. In a sarcastic inversion of
its intended meaning, it framed critical media reports at the time and re-emerged in
the late 1960s to denounce oﬃcial inhumanity. In his 1967 memoir, entitled Im
Schweizer Rettungsboot (In the Swiss Lifeboat), former refugee Max Brusto
deplored the degrading treatment he had received in Swiss refugee camps during
the Second World War. In the same year, Alfred A. Ha¨sler published Das Boot ist
voll, which became the most inﬂuential non-ﬁction book on Swiss asylum policy
ever to appear. In 1969, an English translation was published under the title The
Lifeboat Is Full. Ha¨sler’s book also provided the basis for the 1981 Oscar-nomi-
nated ﬁlm Das Boot ist voll by Swiss director Markus Imhoof.5
With its amazing proliferation, von Steiger’s infamous metaphor has informed
cultural grappling in the past decades with Swiss asylum policy replacing the ana-
logy suggested by Leopold Lindtberg’s gripping movie The Last Chance.6 This
award-winning ﬁlm, depicting the escape of a handful of refugees – Allied
POWs, Jews from Russia, Germany and Western Europe, and Italian children –
over snow-covered Alps and their rescue by Swiss troops, was released on 26 May
1945. In many theatres, The Last Chance was shown together with Allied footage
from liberated concentration camps, which provided a stark contrast to the happy
ending of the movie’s dramatic story. Striking a chord with the war-weary public,
the ﬁlm instantly became an international success after Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
4 See, for example, S. Ma¨chler, ‘Ein Abgrund zwischen zwei Welten. Zwei Ru¨ckweisungen ju¨discher
Flu¨chtlinge im Jahre 1942’, Studien und Quellen. Zeitschaft des Schweizerischen Bundesarchivs, 22 (1996),
137–232 Also S. Ma¨chler, Hilfe und Ohnmacht. Der Schweizerische Israelitische Gemeindebund und die
nationalsozialistische Verfolgung 1933–1945 (Zurich 2005), 293–338.
5 See M. Brusto, Im schweizerischen Rettungsboot (Munich 1967); Ha¨sler’s book appeared in more
than a dozen editions, for the most recent one, see A.A. Ha¨sler, Das Boot ist voll. Die Schweiz und die
Flu¨chtlinge 1933–1945. Mit einem Vorwort von Roger de Weck (Zurich 2008); for the English translation,
see A.A. Ha¨sler, The Lifeboat Is Full. Switzerland and the Refugees, 1933–1945 (New York 1969). The
film by Markus Imhoof appeared as a DVD in the Markus Imhoof Collection, ed. Impuls Home
Entertainment, in 2004.
6 Leopold Lindtberg (1902–84) began his career as an actor and stage director in Germany but left the
country immediately after Hitler’s rise to power. Living as an emigrant in Zurich (on temporary permits
until his naturalization in 1951), he became a pioneer of Swiss film industry. After directing several
sentimental movies on patriotic subjects in the late 1930s and early 1940s, consistent with cultural
policies aimed at spiritual national defence, The Last Chance was the film to earn him international
fame. On Lindtberg, see H. Dumont, Leopold Lindtberg und der Schweizer Film 1935–1953 (Ulm 1981).
On cultural policies of the 1930s, also J. Mooser, ‘‘‘Spiritual National Defence’’ in the 1930s: Swiss
Political Culture between the Wars’, in G. Kreis (ed.) Switzerland and the Second World War (London
2000), 236–60.
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acquired the distribution rights. This turned out to be a blessing for Switzerland. At
a particularly diﬃcult moment – the neutral country was under considerable pres-
sure from the Allies for its reluctance to discontinue economic and ﬁnancial rela-
tions with Nazi Germany in the ﬁnal phase of the war – The Last Chance, with its
tale of distress and salvation, helped polish Switzerland’s tarnished reputation, by
portraying the country as the sanctuary of humanitarianism in the middle of a war-
ridden continent.
The imagery included in both analogies – a small lifeboat in the middle of a
storm and a safe haven behind snow-covered mountains – had wider implications
for the historiography of Swiss asylum policy. With their reference to natural dis-
aster suggesting inescapable constraints, both metaphors centred on the wartime
situation or, more speciﬁcally, the situation when, beginning with the French
debacle in June 1940 and lasting until the liberation of France in August 1944,
Switzerland was surrounded by the Axis powers. In these years, Switzerland was
virtually the only option left for people exposed to Nazi persecution. With the
radicalization of racial persecution in Western Europe in early 1942, this situation
became pressing. The number of civilians, the overwhelming majority of whom
were Jews, trying to escape to Switzerland swelled rapidly. According to oﬃcial
documents, the number of refugees stopped by border police doubled within
months from 132 in May to 248 in July 1942. In the ﬁnal weeks of August more
than 500 refugees would try to enter the country, with more than 300 being expelled
immediately. Thus, Switzerland’s closing of the border to Jews resulted in the
rejection of thousands of racially persecuted people, and it remains unknown
how many of those perished in Nazi extermination camps.7
These events have since given rise to waves of public indignation as well as
oﬃcial strategies of denial. During the Second World War, censorship prevented
publication of unpleasant facts. At the end of the war, the responsible authorities,
eager to polish Switzerland’s humanitarian reputation, palliated their contentious
wartime decisions. In the following years, however, the leaking of classiﬁed docu-
ments and information previously withheld from public knowledge repeatedly
caused scandals. Most notorious was Switzerland’s participation in the making
of the ‘J’-stamp, revealed in the mid-1950s by Allied publication of German for-
eign-policy documents. This discriminatory measure, introduced by Nazi Germany
in the fall of 1938 to mark the passports of its Jewish nationals, allowed
Switzerland (and other liberal countries that followed suit) to require entry visas
from German Jews.8 In the mid-1950s, critics took this as evidence of oﬃcial
7 Conservative estimates put the number of refugees who were denied asylum at close to 40,000. This
figure includes 24,398 refugees who were expelled during the Second World War and 14,500 visa
applications of refugees rejected by immigration authorities between the spring of 1938 and
November 1944. See for data and further methodological comments ICE, Switzerland and Refugees
in the Nazi Era, 129 and 139. In recent years, however, the accuracy of these figures has been the subject
of heated debate and attempts at revision, see R. Ludi, ‘Die Historisierung der Erinnerung. Die Bergier-
Kommission und ihre Repzeption’, Traverse, 1 (2013), 275–92.
8 Ibid., 75–85. Among the countries benefiting from the Swiss initiative were Sweden and Belgium, see
F. Caestecker and B. Moore, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Immigration Policies in Liberal States in
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readiness to sacriﬁce fundamental constitutional principles, and they saw the clos-
ing of the border in 1942 as Swiss complicity in Nazi antisemitism. Domestic and
international outrage prompted the federal government to commission an oﬃcial
examination, published in 1957, which shed light on Switzerland’s restrictive and
antisemitic asylum policy in the Nazi period.9 Public grappling with these results,
however, was transient and without major consequences. Until the late 1960s, it
failed to question the lifeboat imagery and the interpretation it entailed. Only then,
books, documentaries and ﬁlms began to address humanitarian failures and popu-
larize alternative visions. Supported by new research of the 1980s and 1990s and
rising Holocaust awareness, the acknowledgment that Switzerland refused to save
thousands of Jews provided the foundation for the most controversial conclusion
reached by the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland – Second World
War. By rejecting Jewish refugees, ‘Swiss oﬃcials helped the Nazi regime achieve its
goals [of racial extermination], whether intentionally or not,’ the historians’ com-
mission stated in its 1999 report on asylum policy.10
Yet, the imagery of the aforementioned metaphors, especially their emphasis on
the country’s seclusion, promoted a vision of Swiss refugee policy in isolation from
international trends and transnational entanglements, an impression the historians
commission failed to correct in its 1999 report on refugee policy. For fear of
relativizing Swiss responsibilities at a moment when public denial of Swiss wrong-
doing and rejection of international criticism were particularly strong, the report’s
authors omitted international comparison and paid little attention to transnational
dimensions of interwar refugee policy. As a consequence, these aspects have since
failed to attract much scholarly attention.11 Moreover, the concentration of
research on the wartime situation corresponds with the neglect of the postwar
history of refugees, including the warm reception Switzerland prepared for
Hungarians after the failed uprising of 1956, the one example cited in contrast to
wartime asylum policy.
In this article, therefore, I will mainly address two issues pertaining to those less
examined aspects of Swiss refugee history. One question concerns the continuity
and discontinuity in oﬃcial and public attitudes towards refugees since the First
World War. Most of the recent literature interprets that history in the light of the
Western Europe and the Flight from Nazi Germany’, in F. Caestecker and B. Moore (eds) Refugees
from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States (New York 2010), 193–326, esp. 267. On Swiss
Jewish responses of the 1930s to the discriminatory visa provisions, see Ma¨chler, Hilfe und Ohnmacht.
Der Schweizerische Israelitische Gemeindebund und die nationalsozialistische Verfolgung 1933–1945, 182–
9. On the postwar dealing with the ‘J’-stamp history, see also G. Kreis, Die Ru¨ckkehr des J-Stempels.
Zur Geschichte einer schwierigen Vergangenheitsbewa¨ltigung (Zurich 2000).
9 C. Ludwig, Die Flu¨chtlingspolitik der Schweiz in den Jahren 1933 bis 1955. Bericht an den Bundesrat
zuhanden der eidgeno¨ssischen Ra¨te (Bern 1957).
10 ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 271.
11 More recent publications mostly concentrate on local history or specialized problems. See, for
instance, N. Sibold, Zur Geschichte der Juden in Basel, 1930er bis 1950er Jahre (Zurich 2010); J.
Krummenacher, Flu¨chtiges Glu¨ck. Die Flu¨chtlinge im Grenzkanton St. Gallen zur Zeit des
Nationalsozialismus (Zurich 2005); H. Spira, La frontie`re jurassienne au quotidien 1939–1945 (Geneva
2010).
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critical events of 1942 and seeks to explain Swiss refusal to recognize Jews as
deserving refugees at the very moment when their exposure to mortal danger
could no longer be ignored. The dominating narrative ﬁnds the explanation in
oﬃcial antisemitism and its public resonance, implying an almost unbroken con-
tinuity in the prejudice guiding oﬃcial practices and policy on all issues of immi-
gration and naturalization from the early to the mid-twentieth century.12 There is,
indeed, plenty of evidence of discrimination against Jews in the interwar era. This
includes, for instance, the ready adoption of Nazi racial categories by individual
oﬃcials and public agencies, the abandonment of the diplomatic protection of
Swiss Jews abroad and internal numerus clausus on the naturalization of Jews,
all of which indicates that the involved agencies treated Jews as second-class
citizens.13
However, this narrative tends to obscure the fact that decision-makers faced
several critical moments which challenged previous routine and required them to
assess situations carefully and take clear positions. Moreover, international com-
parison suggests a more complex dynamic was involved in turning aliens into vir-
tual enemies who were perceived as undesirable competitors in the job market,
foreign agents and troublemakers posing a threat to national security and as car-
riers of contagion in the literal and ﬁgurative sense. Often, cultural prejudice merely
rationalized merciless treatment of people with no country and no place to stay, as
the international practice in dealing with stateless persons demonstrated, but it was
not necessarily the precondition for inhuman practices. The fear of economic crisis
and mass unemployment, with its consequent risks of social turmoil and
Bolshevism, hovered over much interwar policy deliberation. Accordingly, the con-
cept of the enemy was ﬂuid: combining traits from diﬀerent sources and adapting
them to the speciﬁc circumstances. In this respect, Switzerland did not fundamen-
tally diﬀer from other European states.
Moreover, the question of continuity and discontinuity has to be considered in
conjunction with the international dynamics of the 1930s. Once a state had intro-
duced restrictive measures in response to the refugee crisis – especially during the
Great Depression – other governments were quick to follow out of fear of becom-
ing a magnet for impoverished asylum seekers. At some point in the 1930s, this
dynamic acquired a momentum that seemed almost inescapable. Still, states’ deter-
mination to reject refugees created problems of previously unknown magnitude.
An increase in clandestine deportations of undesirable aliens from one state to
another – the ‘tossing of the human victim from state to state’ dubbed ‘inter-
national ping-pong’ at the time and poignantly described by many contemporaries
including Norman Bentwich, B. Traven and Hannah Arendt – testiﬁed to the
12 In this line, for instance P. Kury, U¨ber Fremde reden. U¨berfremdungsdiskurs und Ausgrenzung in der
Schweiz 1900–1945 (Zurich 2003); also the contributions in A. Mattioli (ed.), Antisemitismus in der
Schweiz 1848–1960 (Zurich 1998).
13 See J. Picard, Die Schweiz und die Juden 1933–1945. Schweizerischer Antisemitismus, ju¨dische
Abwehr und internationale Migrations- und Flu¨chtlingspolitik (Zurich 1994).
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rapidly declining respect for human dignity.14 At the same time, the practice caused
diplomatic complications and stimulated international cooperation in repressing
the movements of populations. An adequate understanding of this dynamic
requires abandoning the lifeboat metaphor and considering Swiss refugee policy
from a wider inter- and transnational perspective.
At the beginning of the ‘Forty Years Crisis’, the Swiss public took pride in the liberal
admission of refugees during the past decades. As one of the few states of the nine-
teenth century with a liberal constitution, Switzerland had long been a safe haven for
persecuted revolutionaries from all over Europe, including Russia. Defending the
right to grant asylum as an intrinsic element of national sovereignty, the federal
government normally rejected the demands of monarchic powers for the extradition
of persons wanted for political crimes. It hosted radicals among whom were the
Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini, German emigrants after the failure of the
1848 revolutions and during Bismarck’s ban on the Socialist party, the anarchist
Mikhail Bakunin and, in the early twentieth century, the Russian revolutionaries
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin andLeonTrostky. But in noway did this imply the recognition
of a refugee’s right to protection. ‘Switzerland does not have any obligation to grant
asylum, but we have the right to do so’ explained the Federal CouncillorHenri Druey
in 1848.15 The concept of the deserving refugee as someone who was persecuted for
his (or, rarely, her) political convictions was linked to the liberal establishment’s
ideas of national identity. The ideal refugee was the mirror image of the small demo-
cratic state surrounded by authoritarian states with insatiable appetites for power.
But with the First World War, the liberal admission of refugees came to an end.
As elsewhere in Europe, new immigration barriers interrupted the previous freedom
of movement. A source of bourgeois angst, domestic unrest and revolutionary
uprisings abroad raised a call for new controls. The economically and socially dif-
ﬁcult years following the end of the First World War allowed the federal authorities
to wrest jurisdiction over aliens from the cantons and centralize it with the federal
police oﬃce. In 1925, the right to grant asylum was constitutionally deﬁned as a
federal prerogative. According to the general understanding, aliens persecuted
abroad for their political activity deserved protection unless they constituted a
risk to national security. However, the distinction between asylum and immigration
policies was anything but clear. Heinrich Rothmund, head of the federal police
oﬃce and the main architect of Switzerland’s immigration policy, dominated deci-
sion-making in both areas for the three decades from the early 1920s until the early
1950s. He was committed to preventing the country’s ‘inﬁltration by foreigners’
14 N. Bentwich, ‘The League of Nations and Refugees’, The British Yearbook of International Law, 16,
(1935), 114–29, here 117. See also B. Traven, trans. E. Sutton, The Death Ship. The Story of an American
Sailor (London 1934) (the German original appeared in 1926). H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism
(New York 1951).
15 See the contributions in C. Goehrke and W.G. Zimmermann, (eds), ‘‘Zuflucht Schweiz’’. Der
Umgang mit Asylproblemen im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Zurich 1994). Cited after M. Mittler, Der
Weg zum Ersten Weltkrieg: Wie neutral war die Schweiz? Kleinstaat und europa¨ischer Imperialismus
(Zurich 2003), 43 (my translation).
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(‘U¨berfremdung’), which he often equated to the projected rise in the tiny Jewish
population. In the interwar era, Rothmund repeatedly declared that ﬁghting anti-
semitism required preventing the country’s ‘Jewiﬁcation’. In the 1930s, he pressured
the Swiss Jewish community into complying with oﬃcial asylum policy by obligat-
ing its leadership to guarantee the ﬁnancial support of all Jewish refugees and
threatening to close the border if the Swiss Jews were not willing or able to pay.16
By the early 1930s, new competencies and the creation of an eﬃcient bureau-
cracy enabled the federal authorities to harmonize the admittance of foreigners on
the basis of coherent principles and more tightly regulate entry visas, work and
residence permits and naturalization procedures. At the same time, interest groups
with very diverse agendas – trade unions, the tourist industry, professional associ-
ations, etc. – exerted increasing pressure on immigration policy. Their lobbying
activity as well as the growing opportunity to be heard by the authorities reﬂected
international trends in the intensiﬁcation of state intervention and the preference
for corporatist regulation of all areas of the economy.17 These transformations had
an enormous impact: the proportion of aliens declined from almost 15 per cent of
the total population in 1910 to 9 per cent in 1930 and 5 per cent in 1941 while
naturalization became increasingly more diﬃcult.18
In comparison to the liberal nineteenth-century asylum practice, the situation
for asylum seekers was drastically diﬀerent. In 1931, new legislation, the Federal
Law on the Residence and Settlement of Foreigners, did not privilege refugees or
distinguish them from other immigrants. For example, refugees who became public
charges were subject to expulsion and work permits were available only under very
restricted conditions and with the consent of professional associations. Only
Nansen refugees, who were protected by the international arrangements of the
1920s, enjoyed preferential treatment and, as the only refugee category at that
time, were entitled to public assistance. However, just a tiny group of people actu-
ally beneﬁted from these provisions. As John Hope Simpson’s comparative study
of 1939 stated, ‘Russian refugees were not welcome in Switzerland, and their num-
ber. . . appears to be small.’ It amounted to less than 2500 people according to
diﬀerent sources.19 Also, federal authorities in the 1920s were very hesitant to
16 Ma¨chler, Hilfe und Ohnmacht. Der Schweizerische Israelitische Gemeindebund und die nationalso-
zialistische Verfolgung 1933–1945. On Rothmund, see also H. Roschewski, Rothmund und die Juden.
Eine historische Fallstudie des Antisemitismus in der schweizerischen Flu¨chtlingspolitik 1933–1957 (Basel
1997).
17 U. Gast, Von der Kontrolle zur Abwehr. Die eidgeno¨ssische Fremdenpolizei im Spannungsfeld von
Politik und Abwehr (Zurich 1997). From a comparative perspective also Caestecker and Moore,
Refugees from Nazi Germany. On corporatist regulation, especially in response to the Great
Depression, P. Mu¨ller, La Suisse en crise (1929–1936). Les politiques mone´taire, financie`re, e´conomique
et sociale de la Confe´de´ration helve´tique (Lausanne 2010).
18 For data, see M. Vuilleumier, ‘E´trangers’ Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, http://www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/f/F10384.php (accessed 30 January 2012).
19 J.H. Simpson, (ed.), The Refugee Problem. Report of a Survey (London 1939), 397. For the Swiss
data see Documents Diplomatiques Suisses (DDS) 12, N 113, 231–2. On the treatment of Russian
refugees, see also C. Gehrig, ‘Bundesbeitra¨ge zur Unterstu¨tzung bedu¨rftiger und kranker Russen in
der Schweiz (1918–1951)’, in M. Bankowski, P. Brang, C. Goehrke and W.G. Zimmermann (eds) Asyl
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recognize Italian antifascists as victims of political persecution. This was mainly
out of consideration of fascist sensitivities and to avoid complications with the
Mussolini regime. Frequent clashes between Italian refugees and fascist agents
drew undesired attention and interfered with the diplomatic priorities of Foreign
Minister Giuseppe Motta, a conservative catholic belonging to Switzerland’s
Italian-speaking minority who placed great emphasis on warm relations with the
country’s southern neighbour. Thus, at best, federal authorities would turn a blind
eye when local border police occasionally let Italian refugees enter the country
illegally in order to travel to France.20
Events in Germany eventually compelled decision-makers to further spell out
the principles of asylum policy. Between April and September 1933, immigration
control at Basel’s train station registered 10,000 refugees from Germany – the
majority of these were Jews among whom were many intellectuals and academics.
An unknown number of people crossed at other points along the Swiss–German
border. In spite of this massive inﬂux, the federal government decided to leave the
border open. But the authorities refused to grant these people refugee status assum-
ing that most of them would return to Germany once the situation had calmed
down or ﬁnd more permanent exile in other countries like, for instance, France,
which liberally admitted refugees for most of 1933.21 And, indeed, by the end of
1933, no more than 2500 refugees from the Third Reich were still in Switzerland.
Up to 90 per cent of those who had left Germany earlier that year were said to have
returned to their homes within weeks or months.22
On 31 March 1933, the Federal Council, in anticipation of mass ﬂight from the
Third Reich, declared that Switzerland would abide by its humanitarian tradition
and oﬀer shelter to people who faced persecution because of their political activity.
In reality, however, the federal authorities endorsed a very narrow understanding
of who constituted a political refugee. Between 1933 and 1945, no more than 644
people qualiﬁed for this legal status. Communists, for instance, were explicitly
excluded, and antifascists in general were not very welcome. In anticipation of
their rejection, communists tried to enter Switzerland under false identities and,
when successful, lived in hiding, relying on the solidarity networks of their com-
rades.23 Frequent Nazi complaints about hostile agitation from Swiss territory
prompted the police to put aliens under strict surveillance and rigidly enforce the
und Aufenthalt. Die Schweiz als Zuflucht und Wirkungssta¨tte von Slaven im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Basel
1994), 161–72.
20 This practice is documented in border guard reports of the 1930s in FA E 4320 (B) 1990/270, vol. 3.
On Giuseppe Motta see Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz, online-edition http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/
textes/d/D3524.php (accessed 5 June 2012).
21 See V. Caron, Uneasy Asylum. France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942 (Stanford, CA
1999).
22 J.-C. Wacker, Humaner als Bern. Schweizer und Basler Asylpraxis gegenu¨ber ju¨dischen Flu¨chtlingen
von 1933–1945 im Vergleich (Basel 1992), 75. See also Sibold, Zur Geschichte der Juden in Basel, 1930er
bis 1950er Jahre, 253.
23 For data, see ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 22. On the treatment of political
refugees also H. Wichers, Im Kampf gegen Hitler. Deutsche Sozialisten im Schweizer Exil 1933–1945
(Basel 1994)
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ban on political activity. As late as the mid-1930s, local police authorities would
occasionally hand communists arrested on political grounds or for violating immi-
gration regulations over to the Germans. Even recognized refugees risked expul-
sion, sometimes for trivial oﬀences or mere suspicion, if they continued their
antifascist activity in exile.24 An internal memo of 1939 speciﬁed:
We seek expulsion of foreigners whose overall character is extremely unpleasant and
antisocial, but who are often clever enough not to oﬀer any speciﬁc reason for expul-
sion and whom we often had not been able to remove up to now.
With the beginning of the war in Europe, anxieties over the presence of strangers
deepened. Often, authorities and the public alike perceived aliens as foreign agents
committed to undermining the country’s stability. Suspecting a security risk in
every stranger present in Swiss territory, one member of a cantonal government
declared in 1943: ‘Those who say ‘‘stranger,’’ speak of danger to our country,’ and,
accordingly, demanded the rigorous removal of suspicious aliens.25 Given
Switzerland’s almost total enclosure by Axis powers, such expulsions would have
amounted to the extradition of endangered persons to the very states where they
were in danger in violation of the non-refoulement principle established by the
Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from
Germany of 1936. Thus, the authorities often suspended expulsion until the end
of hostilities and instead imprisoned those undesirable aliens who would have been
exposed to harm abroad.26
In the spring of 1933, the Swiss authorities decided that Jews from Germany
would qualify as political refugees only if they faced persecution for their political
activity. Accordingly, the Swiss did not recognize Jewish oﬃcials forced out of their
jobs, for instance, or people escaping public harassment and the boycott of their
businesses as political refugees but classiﬁed them as ‘emigrants’. Due to overpopu-
lation, instability in the labour market and the risks associated with foreign inﬁl-
tration, the federal government declared that Switzerland could only be a country
of transit for these people. Thus, those classiﬁed as ‘emigrants’ were granted only
temporary residence and issued residency permits that had to be renewed every
three to six months. Also, a deposit of several thousand Swiss francs was exacted
from applicants, which funds were meant to cover any liability in case of sudden
24 For examples, see Wichers, Im Kampf gegen Hitler. Deutsche Sozialisten im Schweizer Exil 1933-
1945.
25 Orders regarding a decree of the Federal Council, 17 November 1939, cited after ICE, Switzerland
and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 151; also ibid. 150.
26 For a collection of expulsion orders, see FA, E 4320 (B) 1991/87, Vol. 4. See also S. Heim,
‘International Refugee Policy and Jewish Immigration under the Shadow of National Socialism’, in
Caestecker and Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany, 17–47. The Provisional Arrangement, however,
was limited to German and formerly Austrian refugees. Legally, it can be argued that the expulsion of
refugees coming from Nazi-occupied Europe to French or German territory nonetheless represented a
violation of those regulations. See W. Ka¨lin, ‘Rechtliche Aspekte der schweizerischen Flu¨chtlingspolitik
im Zweiten Weltkrieg’, in Die Schweiz, der Nationalsozialismus und das Recht. I. O¨ffentliches Recht, ed.
ICE (Zurich 2001), 261–515.
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departure or expulsion. Moreover, ‘emigrants’ were required to prepare their
resettlement and refrain from any kind of paid work. The ban on work weighed
heavily on refugees. A lack of resources forced many to leave Switzerland quickly,
which result the regulation was intended to produce, or solicit aid organizations for
assistance, which normally came with strings attached. Others depended on their
assets, which were rapidly declining as a result of severe property losses suﬀered
because of crippling Nazi restrictions and taxation on the transfer of assets from
the Third Reich. Moreover, as a manual for emigrants warned in 1935, ‘the ban on
the employment of foreigners is very rigorously enforced’ in Switzerland, and the
authorities could often count on the assistance of professional associations that
were eager to protect their members from unwanted competition and some of
which zealously reported refugees’ infringements of the rule. Fearing competition
from German writers whose work had been banned by the Nazis and who had lost
publishing alternatives, the Swiss Writers Association was a particularly active
informer. To escape detection, authors in exile were forced to publish under pen
names. For instance, the German communist Kurt Kla¨ber, who escaped to
Switzerland in 1933, began writing children’s literature. His best known novel,
The Outsiders of Uskoken Castle (Rote Zora in German), was published in 1941
under the pseudonym Kurt Held. Occasionally, Kla¨ber also used the name of his
wife, Lisa Tetzner, herself a well-known author of children’s books.27
In 1939, Great Britain stopped immigration to Palestine while the United States
continuously raised the hurdles for refugees from Europe, as did most other coun-
tries in the wake of the Evian Conference. As increasingly restrictive immigration
practices abroad, as well as warfare, allowed fewer and fewer people to resettle, the
Swiss government ordered ‘emigrants’ and political refugees to be interned in
camps. Those who were physically able to work had to participate in public
labour programmes such as road construction, logging and agricultural work.
Designed to relieve private charities that bore the brunt of the refugees’ support,
camp internment also facilitated surveillance and had the additional beneﬁt of
easing the military’s worries. Separating refugees from Swiss civilians helped relieve
security concerns about foreign agents disguised as asylum seekers and neutralized
the army’s fear that large groups of aliens would become a source of unrest.
Refugees who were admitted during the war underwent similar procedures. After
spending some months in assembly centres under military control, they were
assigned to refugee camps and other mass accommodations; families were sepa-
rated and children often placed with foster parents. The camp system – its dull
routine, lack of privacy and strict rules – became a major source of discontent. In a
letter to a member of parliament, an anonymous author acknowledged that ‘most
27 M. Wischnitzer, Die Juden der Welt. Gegenwart und Geschichte des Judentums in allen La¨ndern
(Berlin 1957), 177 (my translation). Also R. Ludi, ‘Dwindling Options: Seeking Asylum in Switzerland
1933–1939’, in Caestecker and Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany, 82–102. On the Swiss Writers’
Association also K. Schulz, ‘Die Schweiz und das literarische Exil (1933–1945)’, Jahrbuch fu¨r euro-
pa¨ische Geschichte, 7 (2006), 65–88, esp. 83–4.
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refugees long for the hour when they can leave Switzerland as quickly as
possible’.28
As the external threat declined, criticism of the conditions in the camps and the
refugees’ harsh treatment became louder and increasingly bitter and, eventually,
compelled authorities to relax restrictions. ‘Today’s emigrant could be tomorrow’s
prime minister’, a member of parliament warned in 1944 and added, ‘His view of
Switzerland cannot be a matter of indiﬀerence to us.’29 The realization that refu-
gees’ voices would count in postwar Europe slowly helped improve conditions.
Labour camps and most other mass accommodations were dismantled at the end
of hostilities abroad. But, the basic principles ruling the treatment of refugees
(transmigration, the ban on paid work and mandatory asset management)
remained in force largely unmodiﬁed until Swiss ratiﬁcation of the UN Refugee
Convention in 1955. At the same time, federal authorities were adamant about
getting rid of refugees as quickly as possible. They rushed them out of the country
as soon as transportation allowed. By the end of the 1940s, most of the 51,000
civilians admitted during the Second World War, among them about 19,500 Jews,
had left the country. Nevertheless, several thousand refugees – many from
Germany and Austria – were unwilling or unable to resettle elsewhere for reasons
of health, age or political convictions. After a long struggle led by relief organiza-
tions, authorities issued regulations in 1947–8 that made pre-war and wartime
refugees eligible for permanent residence and allowed them to take jobs and liber-
ate themselves from their debilitating dependency on charities and from the need
for the authorities’ consent to every minor purchase they wanted to make. Yet,
only 1345 persons out of several thousand beneﬁted from the new rules.30
This history of authorities’ seemingly unchangeable commitment to fundamen-
tal principles betokens an unbroken continuity in immigration policy from the First
World War until the early 1950s. The major players in the implementation of
asylum policy – police authorities and, from the beginning of the Second World
War, a growing number of military personnel – largely ignored the basic distinction
between refugees and other aliens. They refused to classify refugees as persons in
need of protection but, instead, treated them as undesirable aliens regardless of
their conditions or reasons for escaping. Also, in response to the humanitarian
crisis caused by Germany’s annexation of Austria and the subsequent Nazi
policy of forcing Jews out of the Third Reich, the authorities repeatedly reinforced
their refusal to recognize Jews as political refugees. Leading oﬃcials did acknow-
ledge that Jews faced particular dangers – including imprisonment in concentration
camps – if they returned to Germany but, at the same time, expressed their
28 ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 164. On the camp system, see also S. Erlanger, ‘Nur
ein Durchgangsland’. Arbeitslager und Internierungsheime fu¨r Flu¨chtlinge und Emigranten 1940–1949
(Zurich 2006).
29 ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 167.
30 Erlanger, ‘Nur ein Durchgangsland’, 233–8. Also H. Kocher, Rationierte Menschlichkeit.
Schweizerischer Protestantismus im Spannungsfeld von Flu¨chtlingsnot und o¨ffentlicher Flu¨chtlingspolitik
der Schweiz 1933–1948 (Zurich 1996). On mandatory management of the refugees’ assets, see ICE,
Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 210–26.
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conviction that abandoning earlier decisions meant opening the ﬂoodgates. In
anticipation of the introduction of new German passports for all Austrians,
Swiss diplomats sought means to identify Jewish refugees without cancelling the
interwar visa-waiver agreement with Germany. They rejected this option because of
its negative consequences for the tourist industry and Swiss-German business rela-
tions. The Nazi regime eventually complied with Swiss desires and introduced the
‘J’-stamp, although this step contradicted its policy of removing Jews from the
Third Reich’s territory by adding to the diﬃculties they faced in ﬁnding countries
to which they could emigrate. Based on the German measures, Switzerland
required entry visas from Jewish citizens of the Third Reich. In the fall of 1939,
in response to the beginning of the war in Europe, the Swiss extended their visa
requirement to include all foreigners. Thus, the closing of the border in August
1942 might seem like a mere conﬁrmation of this step, an obvious and automatic
continuation of earlier practice.
In reality, however, the situation was more complicated. The federal authorities’
eﬀorts to defend their controversial decision of 13 August 1942 indicated that
closing the border was anything but the natural consequence of their earlier deci-
sions. Instead, the growing number of people trying to escape to Switzerland and
the dawning awareness that these refugees were in mortal danger required diﬃcult
choices. Some oﬃcials expressed their scruples about rejecting Jewish refugees and
thereby signalled that previous practice had acquired an entirely new meaning: it
meant sending refugees back to their deaths. As a consequence, government experts
contemplated extending the same procedures to Jewish refugees as were applied to
political refugees, which, in the ﬁnal analysis, constituted recognition that victims
of racial persecution deserved the same protection as political refugees and had to
be assimilated to that privileged category.31 Also, confusion reigned among those
who were charged with the implementation of the new regulations. Many inter-
preted them more widely than intended or knowingly disregarded their instruc-
tions. Some border guards simply looked away when civilians tried to enter the
country illegally, and some diplomats issued visas to people belonging to the cat-
egory of undesirable aliens. Eventually, authorities could defend the brutal meas-
ures by citing the need to suppress the criminal activity ﬂourishing in some border
areas, where the smuggling of refugees had become a lucrative business.32
All of this suggests that the order of August 1942 was not routine and business
as usual but, rather, motivated by concerns about the potential mass inﬂux of aliens
and its impact on Switzerland. More generous admittance of refugees would have
sent encouraging signals to Jews exposed to deportation in Nazi-occupied Europe,
but federal authorities chose to transmit the opposite message and deter potential
31 For the best survey of those ambivalences, see G. Koller, ‘Entscheidungen u¨ber Leben und Tod.
Die beho¨rdliche Praxis in der schweizerischen Flu¨chtlingspolitik wa¨hrend des Zweiten Weltkriegs’,
Studien und Quellen. Zeitschaft des Schweizerischen Bundesarchivs, 22 (1996), 17–106, esp. 22–9.
32 ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 111–27, also S. Keller, Gru¨ningers Fall. Geschichten
von Flucht und Hilfe (Zurich 1993); Krummenacher, Flu¨chtiges Glu¨ck. Die Flu¨chtlinge im Grenzkanton
St. Gallen zur Zeit des Nationalsozialismus.
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asylum seekers from risking the dangerous journey to the Swiss border. At
the same time, they criminalized all forms of assistance to refugees trying to
enter the country illegally.33 No doubt, their decisions must be considered in the
period’s diﬃcult context, a time when Nazi domination of Europe was almost total
and the outcome of the war uncertain. Still, the contemporary argument that
Switzerland had no other option because any other policy would have over-
stretched the country’s resources did not convince everybody. Advocates for refu-
gees argued that a more generous practice would have almost no eﬀect on the
supply situation. The overall reduction of the daily bread ration, they calculated,
would be less than 10 grams if 14,000 additional refugees were to be accepted.34
National security arguments were losing their persuasiveness in the course of 1943
following the Allied landing in North Africa and the German defeat at Stalingrad.
And yet, that year witnessed the harshest enforcement of the decision of August
1942. Jews were expelled, and forced labourers, mostly of Soviet and Polish origin,
who showed up at the Swiss border in growing numbers, were denied admission
though their severe mistreatment and the draconian punishment (including the
death penalty) for attempting to escape from Nazi Germany were known.35
Control at the border relaxed gradually through the fall of 1943 in response to
the mass exodus caused by German occupation of Northern Italy. At ﬁrst, the
inﬂux of thousands of refugees from Italy took Swiss agencies completely by sur-
prise and in many places overwhelmed military and civilian border guards, who in
the prevailing chaos admitted refugees who under diﬀerent circumstances would
have been turned away. Eventually, protests by the local population, who often
had family in Northern Italy, prevented the subsequent expulsion of these people.
In the longer run, these events slowly changed the overall practice. Thus, the
closing of the border in August 1942 must be seen as a discontinuity disguised as
the continuation of previous practice. This conclusion must be considered against
the backdrop of wider transnational developments in the handling of immigration
matters in Europe.
In April 1939, top immigration oﬃcials from Belgium, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and Switzerland gathered in Brussels for a conﬁdential exchange of
information supposedly to assist the Intergovernmental Committee in accomplish-
ing its task of organizing the resettlement of refugees from the Third Reich.
According to the proceedings, the delegates concurred in their analysis of the situ-
ation and on the basic principles to be applied. The authorities of all four countries
agreed that rigorous rejection was the only way to deter Nazi Germany from
33 R. Ludi, ‘Fluchthilfe und Vergangenheitspolitik’, in O. Hersche (ed.) Geschichtsbilder, Widerstand,
Vergangenheitspolitik (Zurich 2002), 15–24.
34 B.-E. Lupp, Von der Klassensolidarita¨t zur humanita¨ren Hilfe. Die Flu¨chtlingspolitik der politischen
Linken 1930–1950 (Zurich 2006), 176.
35 Ibid. 189f., also ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 132 f., 148. In the absence of
diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the Soviet Union until 1946, Soviet nationals – apart from
being considered politically suspicious – also lacked the protection and guarantees from their govern-
ment which for other refugees (Dutch or British) was lifesaving.
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dumping its unwanted nationals on their territories. In his concluding statement,
the Belgian delegate expressed his relief over this agreement to set ‘an end to the
alarming ﬂood of refugees’. Evidently, he was in need of such reassurance.
Domestic protests had compelled the authorities of his country to halt the expul-
sion of illegal immigrants. Knowing that refugees could expect the same fate in
neighbouring states, he predicted, would help the Belgians to resume their previous
practice of rejecting undesirable aliens.36
The oﬃcials present in Brussels typically framed their deliberations in military
vocabulary and war imagery portraying immigration policies as national defence
strategies against the ‘invasion’ of aliens and the ‘scourge’ that they represented.
Despite its informal character, the meeting was characteristic of the general atmos-
phere of the late 1930s. Though seemingly aimed at the resolution of a humani-
tarian crisis, international cooperation instead reinforced states’ commitment to a
hard line against all kinds of immigrants. Or, to put it more bluntly, declared
commitment to humanitarian solidarity and international cooperation was a
mere pretext for the coordination of restrictions so that no country would lag
behind the others and thereby attract additional refugees.37 This was quite far
from the idealism that had inspired the international refugee regime if, that is, its
visionary principles ever had been more than lip service paid to humanitarians who
were incensed by the atrocities committed in the shadow of war. In 1921, the ﬁrst
initiatives of ‘humanitarian diplomacy’ – to use a term coined by the French his-
torian Dzovinar Ke´vonian – originated from private organizations. They were
spearheaded by the liberal internationalist Gustave Ador, a former member of
the Swiss government and then the head of the International Committee of the
Red Cross. Behind the scenes, however, it was mainly France that pushed for an
internationalization of the refugee problem. The reason was obvious: as one of the
Allied powers occupying Constantinople, France was burdened with thousands of
White Russians who had ﬂooded the city on their retreat across the Black Sea.
And, the French were quick to end their responsibility for these people once the
League of Nations had created the new position of High Commissioner for
Refugees.38 This revealed much about governments’ motivations for creating the
new refugee regime: their primary incentive for internationalizing the refugee prob-
lem was to reduce their responsibility for organizing the resettlement of displaced
populations. Accordingly, governments’ willingness to participate in international
36 See the confidential proceedings, Document 271 in S. Heim (ed.), Die Verfolgung und Ermordung
der europa¨ischen Juden durch das nationalsozialistische Deutschland 1933–1945. Vol. 2: Deutsches Reich
1938-August 1939 (Munich 2009), 728–34.
37 This interpretation concurs with Susanne Heim’s assessment of international cooperation under the
League of Nations umbrella, see Heim, ‘International Refugee Policy and Jewish Immigration under the
Shadow of National Socialism’, 18.
38 D. Ke´vonian, Re´fugie´s et diplomatie humanitaire. Les acteurs europe´ens et la sce`ne proche-orientale
pendant l’entre-deux-guerres (Paris 2004), 137–44. On the situation in Constantinople, see M. Housden,
‘White Russians Crossing the Black Sea: Fridtjof Nansen, Constantinople and the First Modern
Repatriation of Refugees Displaced by Civil Conflict, 1922–23’, Slavonic and East European Review,
88 (2010), 495–524.
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arrangements depended on the urgency of the domestic refugee problems.39
Thus, the refugee regime emerging under the aegis of the League of Nations
showed many similarities with minority protection. Legal guarantees were little
more than international window dressing if, that is, they did not produce the
opposite of their declared purpose by entrenching resentments and prejudices
against those they were meant to protect and whetting nationalists’ appetites for
ridding their countries of unwanted populations.40
At the same time, political and economic developments of the interwar period
solidiﬁed negative perceptions of displaced populations. All over Europe, immigra-
tion policies were designed in view of an anticipated ‘invasion’ of homeless people,
the ‘international vagrants’ and ‘outlaws’ uprooted by unemployment, hardship,
ethnic hatred and political upheavals in their countries of origin.41 Instead of har-
monizing legislation in favour of asylum seekers, international activity often had the
opposite eﬀect of harmonizing national strategies of repression through the
exchange of knowledge and techniques for the suppression of unwanted population
movements. Accordingly, the international refugee regime generalized the basic
principles adopted bymost countries in their treatment of refugees. But international
norms and institutions were limited in their scope and duration as the architects of
the new system expected the refugees’ situation to normalize after a time. Displaced
people would either opt for repatriation or resettle, preferably overseas, they reck-
oned. Thus, few European states took steps to integrate refugees into the labour
market or make eventual naturalization possible. Notorious for its demographic
fears and demand for manpower, France was one of the few states to actively
pursue an immigration policy. Nevertheless, in response to the mass inﬂux of refu-
gees from Nazi Germany and in view of rising unemployment, conservative govern-
ments of the mid-1930s tightened labour market regulations and restricted the
previously liberal admission of aliens. Like Switzerland, the French subsequently
admitted refugees only temporarily and under the condition that they arrange their
resettlement. In line with the policy adopted by the other European countries,
French diplomats declared, ‘France is a passage [for refugees], not a garage’.42
Obligating private charities to feed and shelter destitute refugees was common
practice in most European countries. In response to the mass ﬂight from the Third
Reich, governments required Jewish communities to guarantee the ﬁnancial
39 Also D. Ke´vonian, ‘Re´flexions pour une Europe sociale: La question des re´fugie´s et le tournant des
anne´es 1929–1933’, in S. Schirmann (ed.) Organisations internationales et architectures europe´ennes
1929–1939 (Metz 2003), 213–27. On the international refugee regime and its guiding principles, see
also C. Skran, Refugees in Inter-War Europe. The Emergence of a Regime (Oxford 1995).
40 See C. Fink, Defending the Rights of Others. The Great Powers, the Jews, and International Minority
Protection, 1878–1938 (Cambridge 2004).
41 Cited after Ke´vonian, Re´fugie´s et diplomatie humanitaire. Les acteurs europe´ens et la sce`ne proche-
orientale pendant l’entre-deux-guerres, 242.
42 Cited after Heim, ‘International Refugee Policy and Jewish Immigration under the Shadow of
National Socialism’, 22. On France, see the assessment by Simpson, The Refugee Problem. Report of
a Survey, 297–8; also Caron, Uneasy Asylum. France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933–1942, 14, 33–6,
and G. Burgess, Refuge in the Land of Liberty: France and its Refugees, from the Revolution to the End of
Asylum, 1787–1939 (Basingstoke 2008), 145–65.
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support of Jewish refugees. In the spring of 1933, the Swiss and the Belgian gov-
ernments were among the ﬁrst to premise their acceptance of asylum seekers on
such a condition. But other states were quick to follow their example.43 And the
international refugee regime did not provide an alternative model; it based its
activities on similar principles. From the very beginning, Fridtjof Nansen’s oﬃce
relied almost entirely on donations from private foundations, among them major
Jewish charities, and the same was true for its successor organizations. In July
1938, the Evian Conference conﬁrmed this principle.44 But, with the increasingly
radical Aryanization policy in Nazi Germany, refugees’ dependence on foreign aid
increased enormously, and the resulting ﬁnancial burden soon overstrained Jewish
minorities in the asylum countries.45
The obligation to maintain destitute refugees in rising numbers entailed add-
itional dilemmas for Jewish charities. The deepening humanitarian crisis made
private associations, often the refugees’ most vociferous advocates, the hostages
of government policies. Only as long as they had suﬃcient means to support add-
itional refugees could Jewish communities call for solidarity with the victims of
racial persecution. Once they ran out of money, however, authorities easily shifted
the blame onto the Jews by explaining restrictions in terms of a lack of Jewish
solidarity. By seemingly conﬁrming the myths of unlimited Jewish wealth and
avarice, this arrangement also made Jewish minorities more vulnerable to antise-
mitic prejudices. Xenophobic circles accused Jews of luring uninvited aliens into the
country and giving precedence to racial solidarity over their patriotic obligations.
Oﬃcial responses to the refugee crisis of the 1930s thus contributed to reinforcing a
nationalistic deﬁnition of membership in the political community. This was one
reason for conservative French Jews in a climate of mounting antisemitism to
endorse their government’s restrictive asylum policy of the mid-1930s. Prior to
the Second World War, the Swiss Jewish community was able to resist similar
pressure though it could not avoid huge ﬁnancial concessions and compliance
with oﬃcial regulations. Contributions from the American Jewish Joint
Distribution Committee, which began in 1938, helped it to overcome resulting
ﬁnancial shortages. The closing of the border in 1942, however, paralysed Swiss-
Jewish leadership. Realizing their powerlessness, community leaders were unable to
eﬀectively oppose inhuman government action.46
43 See the contributions in Caestecker and Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany.
44 T. Sjo¨berg, The Powers and the Persecuted: The Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental
Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938–1947 (Lund 1991), 32–41. A. Grahl-Madsen, ‘The League of
Nations and the Refugees’, in The League of Nations in Retrospect, (Berlin 1983), 363–8.
45 F. Kieffer, Judenverfolgung in Deutschland – eine innere Angelegenheit? Internationale Reaktionen
auf die Flu¨chtlingsproblematik 1933–1939 (Stuttgart 2002).
46 For an excellent analysis, see Ma¨chler, Hilfe und Ohnmacht. Der Schweizerische Israelitische
Gemeindebund und die nationalsozialistische Verfolgung 1933–1945, 381–98. Also H. Zweig-Strauss,
Saly Mayer 1882–1950. Ein Retter ju¨dischen Lebens wa¨hrend des Holocaust (Cologne 2007); on the
practice in other European states, see Caestecker and Moore, ‘A Comparative Analysis of
Immigration Policies in Liberal States in Western Europe and the Flight from Nazi Germany’, 216–20.
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In many European countries, refugee policy further undermined the precarious
situation of Jewish minorities and raised questions about Jews’ claims to equal
citizenship rights. Such repercussions heralded the segregation and exclusion of
the Jewish population from national solidarity under Nazi occupation, and even
in unoccupied Switzerland, federal authorities abandoned the principle of equal
treatment in their protection of Swiss Jewish interests abroad.47 Moreover,
Switzerland’s pre-war refugee policy did not fundamentally diﬀer from other coun-
tries’ approaches. Like other governments, the federal authorities insisted on
national sovereignty in the control of foreign population movements but in reality
their policies corresponded with the international trends, economic developments
and political events abroad. Their active international cooperation did not contra-
dict any of the principles for the domestic treatment of refugees.48 Rather, cooper-
ation tended to reinforce the authorities in their conviction that repressive regimes
in neighbouring countries would understand generosity vis-a-vis refugees as a sign
of weakness and, accordingly, exploit it. In 1938, Rothmund warned that accepting
people dumped on Swiss territory by the Gestapo would merely encourage
Germany to continue the practice. According to this rationale, stopping Nazi vio-
lation of international law required unﬂinching rejection of these refugees. With
similar arguments, other governments advised against the creation of new inter-
national guarantees, which, they claimed, would only stimulate states to expel their
unwanted populations.49
Moreover, lower-level diplomacy like, for example, the aforementioned Brussels
meeting of 1939, was probably much more frequent than the lack of research leads
us to assume. Given the growing irritation over the widespread practice of expelling
uninvited immigrants to neighbouring countries, some of those meetings resulted in
– often secret – bilateral agreements on the expulsion of aliens. As another exam-
ple, local police authorities along sections of the Swiss–French border made such
arrangements in the late 1930s and reconﬁrmed some of them after the German and
Italian occupation of French border areas in 1940. Swiss oﬃcers repeatedly
informed their German colleagues about the expulsion of Jews and other refugees.
As late as 1943, Gestapo oﬃcers could simply wait at the border to pick up their
victims and put them on the next deportation convoy.50
47 Picard, Die Schweiz und die Juden 1933–1945. Schweizerischer Antisemitismus, ju¨dische Abwehr und
internationale Migrations- und Flu¨chtlingspolitik, esp. 145–217.
48 Between 1922 and 1935, Switzerland participated in six refugee conferences organized by the
League of Nations. In addition, Swiss experts were prominently represented in international refugee
agencies. Twice, Swiss citizens headed the League of Nation’s Nansen Office in the 1930s. See Botschaft
des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung u¨ber den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Internationalen
Flu¨chtlingsorganisation (IRO), 19 January 1949, in Bundesblatt, 101:1 (1949), 103.
49 Memo by H. Rothmund, 3 August 1938, in DDS 12, Document 354, 813-14; report by H.
Rothmund to the President of the Swiss Confederation, 10 August 1938, in DDS 12, Document 357,
817-23.
50 Caestecker and Moore, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Immigration Policies in Liberal States in
Western Europe and the Flight from Nazi Germany’, 224, mention a Dutch–Belgian accord of 1934.
From a comparative perspective, they conclude that the Swiss system ‘had more safeguards against
administrative arbitrariness’ (223) many of which, however, fell victim to the state of emergency with the
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Thus, the value of international cooperation was uncertain from the refugees’
perspective. Though it spelled out certain guarantees including the principle of
non-refoulement enshrined in the 1933 convention and the Provisional
Arrangement for Refugees Coming from Germany of 1936, cooperation also facili-
tated coordination of restrictive measures and promoted what Frank Caestecker
and Bob Moore have called the ‘homogenisation of European refugee policies’.
Furthermore, the beginning of hostilities in Europe served as a justiﬁcation for
tightening regulations and imposing additional restrictions on refugees, their
mobility and their activities in exile. Borders became particularly dangerous
zones for fugitives. With the growing humanitarian emergency, the risk of abuse
of oﬃcial power in the enforcement of regulations, including the use of excessive
brutality, increased to a similar degree as refugees’ vulnerability to extortion by
traﬃckers or corrupt oﬃcers on either side of the border. A Swiss oﬃcer closely
cooperating with French and German colleagues, and accused of using ‘Gestapo-
methods’, exclaimed, ‘I don’t give a damn about what they are saying in the federal
chambers: they’re not going to keep me from doing my job. . . I’ll still turn back
whomever I feel like turning back.’51 Although exceptional, such attitudes were not
merely aberrant. They were the fruit of the increasingly hostile discourse and
restrictive practice in all areas of asylum policy, which were partly propelled by
the transnational dynamics of the interwar era.
By the end of the Second World War, Switzerland’s humanitarian record was
becoming an international liability. When gauged by the oﬃcial claim of humani-
tarianism as a national virtue, the discrepancy could not have been more striking.
Embarking on a strategy of damage control, authorities devised acts of goodwill
intended to pacify Allied discontent with the Swiss neutrality policy. Besides con-
tributions to rehabilitation eﬀorts in Europe, they admitted concentration-camp
survivors from Theresienstadt, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald. But beneﬁciaries of
these programmes were typically aﬀorded only temporary residence geared to their
physical recovery in Swiss sanatoria and recreation homes. Similarly, the Swiss
were adamant in their negotiations with UNRRA about excluding stateless DPs,
anticipating the diﬃculties these survivors would face in ﬁnding permanent resi-
dence abroad. By the end of the 1940s, most of the concentration-camp survivors
admitted for recovery had left the country although many had wished to stay, and
the booming economy would have facilitated their integration into the labour
market.52
beginning of the Second World War. On the arrangements between Swiss and German border guards
see ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 141. The case story of several Jewish refugees the
Swiss border police handed over to German officers in the fall of 1943 is documented because one of the
victims survived Auschwitz. See S. Keller, Die Ru¨ckkehr. Joseph Springs Geschichte (Zurich 2003).
51 For examples, see the Demierre case study in ICE, Switzerland and Refugees in the Nazi Era, 140–6,
quote: 144.
52 On this particular humanitarian act and involved rationale, see M. Lerf, ‘‘Buchenwaldkinder’’ – eine
Schweizer Hilfsaktion. Humanita¨res Engagement, politisches Kalku¨l und individuelle Erfahrung (Zurich
2010).
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Its political objectives notwithstanding, oﬃcial postwar humanitarianism did not
break with previous tradition. This would change dramatically within less than a
decade. In November 1956, over 200,000 refugees left Hungary following Soviet
suppression of the reform movement in Budapest. The West responded with great
urgency to the unfolding humanitarian crisis in neighbouring Austria and
Yugoslavia. In conjunction with the International Committee of the Red Cross,
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Swiss citizen August R. Lindt, set up
eﬃcient machinery for the accommodation, assistance and resettlement of the
Hungarian refugees. In the following months, Switzerland accepted close to 14,000
Hungarians. In international comparison, this was the largest number in proportion
to overall population, and in absolute ﬁgures the number of refugees admitted to
Switzerland was topped only by those taken in by the United Kingdom and trad-
itional immigration countries such as the United States of America and Canada.53
Generous acceptance of Hungarian refugees suggested not only the advent of a
new era but also the application of new principles in contrast to previous practice.
The Swiss did not maintain speciﬁc categories of refugees but admitted anybody
who wished to come. Moreover, newly arrived refugees were not required to trans-
migrate but oﬀered residence in Switzerland. Assisted by oﬃcial job-placement
services, the Hungarians were encouraged to integrate into Swiss society. Swiss
authorities also applied a broad understanding of the Refugee Convention of
1951, which covered only refugees who escaped persecution prior to the docu-
ments’ passage and, so, strictly did not apply to the Hungarians. In an unorthodox
way they argued that the cause of the Hungarians’ plight was the communist
takeover of 1948 and, therefore, Hungarian refugees were entitled to international
protection.54 In reality, however, only a fraction of the Hungarians had left their
country for fear of repression; the large majority chose emigration to escape the
economic restrictions and lack of opportunities at home.55 Nonetheless, the Swiss
recognized these people as victims of political persecution, that is, genuine refugees
in the traditional understanding of the term. They were also committed to alleviat-
ing the Hungarians’ situation by rapidly liberating them from the privations of
mass accommodation in improvised reception centres in order to ‘give them back
their joy of life by oﬀering them an existence that guarantees personal freedom and
human dignity’.56
Swiss generosity was particularly striking when juxtaposed with the restrictive
asylum policy of the Nazi era. This certainly reﬂects the diﬀerent circumstances in
53 ‘Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung u¨ber die Ero¨ffnung eines ausserordentli-
chen Kredits zugunsten der ungarischen Flu¨chtlinge im Ausland und anderer internationaler
Hilfswerke, 17. Mai 1957,’ in Bundesblatt, 109:1 (1957), 1285–6.
54 Die schweizerische Asylpraxis in neuester Zeit. Bericht des Eidgeno¨ssischen Justiz- und
Polizeidepartments. Appendix to Ludwig, Die Flu¨chtlingspolitik der Schweiz in den Jahren 1933 bis
1955. Bericht an den Bundesrat zuhanden der eidgeno¨ssischen Ra¨te, esp. 411–15.
55 Such is the conclusion of former Hungarian refugees quoting fellow emigrants who settled in
Switzerland, see W. Wottreng, Ein einzig Volk von Immigranten. Die Geschichte der Einwanderung in
der Schweiz (Zurich 2000), 170–3.
56 ‘Botschaft des Bundesrates, 17. Mai 1957,’ 1285.
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which Europe’s ﬁrst major refugee crisis of the Cold War period was resolved. In
the mid-1950s, a booming economy and high demand for labour created favour-
able conditions for the admission and smooth integration of the Hungarian refu-
gees. In addition, as young, single males, many of whom were skilled workers and
students, the majority of the refugees ﬁt the period’s job proﬁle ideally.
Furthermore, the dominant anticommunism guaranteed public solidarity with
the Hungarian insurgents particularly in Switzerland, where the postwar discourse
on national identity expressed both citizens’ pride in the country’s unscathed sur-
vival through two world conﬂicts and their rejection of any kind of totalitarianism.
As a government report stated in 1957, ‘the heroism of the Hungarian people has
aroused a wave of sympathy and great largess in the free world, which prompted
instant and eﬀective assistance for the Hungarian refugees’.57
The oﬃcial approach largely echoed public opinion. In response to Soviet sup-
pression of the reform movement, a wave of solidarity had swept through
Switzerland. Students staged torchlight processions in support of the insurgents
while radical anticommunists imagined themselves to be at the start of a partisan
war against anticipated Soviet invasion and distributed manuals for the production
of Molotov cocktails. In their interpretation, the Hungarian uprising conﬁrmed the
West’s cultural superiority; consequently, they welcomed every refugee as a hero in
the struggle for freedom.58 Solidarity with the Hungarians was also inﬂuenced by
the ‘J’-stamp aﬀair of 1954. A younger generation of Swiss citizens understood their
sympathy for the victims of totalitarianism as an act of national rehabilitation
meant to erase the disgrace of humanitarian failure in the face of the Jewish plight.59
But did these events actually mark a break with previous tradition in asylum
policy? Did the warm reception of the Hungarians – and for that matter the sym-
pathy demonstrated towards the refugees of the Prague spring in 1968 – establish a
new model in dealing with the challenges of global migration and political persecu-
tion abroad? There is little reason to believe so. The treatment of refugees from
countries behind the Iron Curtain instead appears to have been a special case framed
through the political and cultural parameters of the Cold War while since the 1980s
asylum practice and legislation have become successively more restrictive in
response to refugee crises outside Europe. In the past decades, right wing populism
gradually eroded the right to asylum, and a series of referendums raised the hurdles
for asylum seekers subjecting rejected refugees to ever more degrading treatment.
57 Ibid., 1277. See also T. Kanyo, ‘Die Ungarnflu¨chtlinge von 1956 in der Schweiz’, Jahrbuch fu¨r
europa¨ische Geschichte, 7 (2006), 89–100, J.W. ten Doesschate, ‘Ungarische Flu¨chtlinge in Europa seit
1956’, in K.J. Bade (ed.) Enzyklopa¨die Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart
(Zurich 2007), 1065–7.
58 Networks for the support of the Hungarian refugees and their militant anticommunism were
instrumental in the formation of Switzerland’s postwar elite. A recent essay collection, including the
memories of some of the period’s most ardent anticommunists and later members of the political
establishment, gives testimony to the bellicose atmosphere in student circles following the events in
Hungary: G. Zabratzky, (ed.) Flucht in die Schweiz. Ungarische Flu¨chtlinge in der Schweiz (Zurich 2006).
59 K. Bretscher-Spindler, Vom heissen zum kalten Krieg. Vorgeschichte und Geschichte der Schweiz im
Kalten Krieg 1943 bis 1968 (Zurich 1997).
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Viewed in the longue dure´e, the generosity demonstrated towards the victims of
communist repression in the 1950s and 1960s bears more similarities with the sym-
pathy fugitive revolutionaries, at risk for their political acts and convictions, could
expect in nineteenth-century Switzerland than with any other refugee category or
period in the history of asylum ever since. When juxtaposed with the rejection faced
by Jewish wartime refugees, the solidarity with the Hungarians seems to have origi-
nated in imagined mental and political aﬃnities. Attributing their escape to their
alleged commitment to liberal values and their love of the freedom of market cap-
italism – in accordance with the Cold War’s binary ideology – these refugees were
depicted as ideally ﬁtting ideas of Swiss identity. Such imagined similarities allowed
the Swiss public and authorities to ignore actual diﬀerences thereby easing the refu-
gees’ integration into Swiss society, which, in turn, reinforced the belief in their
greater capacity to adapt to the Swiss way of life in comparison to other groups
such as, for example, the Jews of the interwar period or, more recently, people
coming from non-European countries. Thanks to the favourable economic condi-
tions of the 1950s and 1960s, the fugitives from Eastern Europe quickly became
neighbours and co-workers very much in contrast to other groups who had earlier
been deliberately separated from the native population through the ban on paid
work or their conﬁnement in mass accommodations, a form of segregation that
reinforced the impression that they somehow represented a threat to Swiss society.
The idea that Jews – and also Russians or Roma and Sinti for that matter – are
fundamentally, innately diﬀerent, that they cause political subversion and the dis-
solution of national identity, was certainly not a Swiss peculiarity but a general
European attitude. It undermined solidarity with endangered people and prevented
their recognition as deserving refugees, as people exposed to mortal danger not for
any fault of their own but for political reasons. Thus, qualifying as a refugee
deserving of public sympathy is not the result of the actual danger to a person’s
life but the consequence of how a society connects the perception of that danger to
its own sense of identity.
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